509 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
509 lines
27 KiB
Markdown
# Multi-Device Conversation Sync — Implementation Plan
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## Context
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meowlib already has scaffolding for multi-device sync:
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| Existing artefact | Where |
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|---|---|
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| `Identity.Device *KeyPair` | `client/identity.go:35` |
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| `Identity.OwnedDevices PeerList` | `client/identity.go:40` |
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| `Peer.Type string` | `client/peer.go:52` |
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| `ToServerMessage.device_messages` (field 10) | `pb/messages.proto:75` |
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| `FromServerMessage.device_messages` (field 9) | `pb/messages.proto:99` |
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| `BackgroundJob.Device *KeyPair` | `client/identity.go:334` |
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The server (`server/router.go`) does **not** yet implement `device_messages` routing; it goes through `messages`/`Chat` today.
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---
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## Chosen Sync Scheme: Event-Driven Delta Sync over Existing Message Infrastructure
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### Rationale
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| Approach | Pros | Cons | Verdict |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Full DB sync | Complete history | Huge payloads, merge conflicts, wasteful | ❌ |
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| Inbox/outbox file sharing | Simple to reason about | File-level granularity, no dedup, breaks privacy model | ❌ |
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| **Event-driven delta sync** | Minimal data, no merge needed, reuses existing crypto + server stack | Requires dedup table | ✅ |
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Each message event (received, sent, status change) is forwarded immediately to sibling devices through the **same server infrastructure** as regular peer messages. Each device maintains its own complete local DB. Convergence is eventual; dedup via `ConversationStatus.Uuid`.
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### Key Design Decisions
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1. **Zero server changes required.** Device sync messages are addressed to the sibling device's lookup key and travel through the existing `msg:{lookup_key}` Redis sorted-set on the server, returned in `from_server.Chat` — identical to peer messages.
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2. **Device peers reuse the `Peer` struct** with `Type = "device"`, stored in `Identity.OwnedDevices`. They have their own three keypairs (`MyIdentity`, `MyEncryptionKp`, `MyLookupKp`) and `MyPullServers`.
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3. **A new proto message `DeviceSyncPayload`** is added to `messages.proto`. It is serialised and placed in `UserMessage.Appdata`; the parent `UserMessage.Type` is set to `"device_sync"`. This lets the client recognise sync messages without any server-side awareness.
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4. **`GetRequestJobs()`** is extended to include device lookup keys alongside peer lookup keys for the appropriate servers, so the background poll thread picks up device sync messages without any extra call.
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5. **Dedup** is handled by a small SQLite table `device_sync_seen` (one table per identity folder, not per peer) keyed on `DeviceSyncPayload.DedupId`.
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---
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## New Protobuf Messages
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Add to `pb/messages.proto` before re-generating:
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```protobuf
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// Payload carried inside UserMessage.appdata for device-to-device sync.
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// The enclosing UserMessage.type MUST be "device_sync".
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message DeviceSyncPayload {
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string sync_type = 1; // "msg" | "status" | "peer_update" | "identity_update" | "server_add" | "forward"
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string peer_uid = 2; // local UID of the peer conversation on the sending device
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DbMessage db_message = 3; // the DbMessage to replicate (sync_type "msg" / "status")
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string dedup_id = 4; // globally unique ID (= DbMessage.status.uuid or generated)
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bytes peer_data = 5; // JSON-encoded Peer snapshot (sync_type "peer_update")
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bytes identity_data = 6; // JSON-encoded identity profile snapshot (sync_type "identity_update")
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bytes forward_payload = 7; // serialized UserMessage for primary to send on behalf of sibling (sync_type "forward")
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string forward_peer_uid = 8; // primary-side peer UID to forward to (sync_type "forward")
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}
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```
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Run `cd pb && ./protogen.sh` after adding this.
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---
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## Implementation Phases
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### Phase 1 — Device Pairing
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**Files to touch:** `client/identity.go`, `client/helpers/` (new file `deviceHelper.go`)
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**Goal:** Allow two app instances owned by the same user to establish a shared keypair relationship, mirroring the peer invitation flow but flagging the peer as `Type = "device"`.
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#### 1.1 `Identity.InitDevicePairing(myDeviceName string, serverUids []string) (*Peer, error)`
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- Identical to `InvitePeer` but sets `peer.Type = "device"`.
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- Stores the resulting peer in `Identity.OwnedDevices` (not `Peers`).
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- Returns the peer so the caller can produce a `ContactCard` QR/file.
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- **Sym + DR inherited automatically**: because the implementation mirrors `InvitePeer`, the device peer will have `MySymKey`, `DrKpPublic`, `DrKpPrivate`, `DrRootKey`, and `DrInitiator = true` populated automatically. The resulting `ContactCard` will carry `dr_root_key` and `dr_public_key` so the answering device can initialise its own DR session via `AnswerDevicePairing`.
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#### 1.2 `Identity.AnswerDevicePairing(myDeviceName string, receivedContact *meowlib.ContactCard) (*Peer, error)`
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- Mirrors `AnswerInvitation`, stores in `OwnedDevices`.
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#### 1.3 `Identity.FinalizeDevicePairing(receivedContact *meowlib.ContactCard) error`
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- Mirrors `FinalizeInvitation`, operates on `OwnedDevices`.
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#### 1.4 Helper functions (new file `client/helpers/deviceHelper.go`)
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```go
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// DevicePairingCreateMessage – wraps an invitation step-1 for a device peer.
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func DevicePairingCreateMessage(peer *client.Peer, serverUid string) ([]byte, string, error)
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// DevicePairingAnswerMessage – wraps invitation step-3 answer for a device peer.
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func DevicePairingAnswerMessage(peer *client.Peer, serverUid string) ([]byte, string, error)
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```
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These reuse `invitationCreateHelper.go`/`invitationAnswerHelper.go` logic.
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#### 1.5 Extend `PeerStorage` operations for OwnedDevices
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`OwnedDevices` is currently a `PeerList` (in-memory slice). This **must** be migrated to the same Badger-backed `PeerStorage` mechanism as `Peers` — it is no longer optional. Device peers carry a Double Ratchet session state (`DrStateJson`) that advances with every message sent or received. Without persistent storage the DR state is lost on restart, breaking the decryption of all subsequent messages. Add a `DeviceStorage PeerStorage` field to `Identity` with its own `DbFile`, and ensure `StorePeer` is called on the device peer after every outbound dispatch (in `DispatchSyncToDevices`) and after every inbound consume (in `ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage`), mirroring the pattern used in `messageHelper.go` and `bgPollHelper.go` for regular peers.
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---
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### Phase 2 — Sync Payload Helpers
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**Files to touch:** `client/helpers/deviceHelper.go` (continued), `client/dbmessage.go`
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#### 2.1 Build a sync message for one sibling device
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```go
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// BuildDeviceSyncMessage wraps a DbMessage into a UserMessage addressed to a
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// sibling device peer. The caller then calls peer.ProcessOutboundUserMessage.
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func BuildDeviceSyncMessage(
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devicePeer *client.Peer,
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syncType string, // "msg" | "status" | "peer_event"
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peerUid string,
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dbm *meowlib.DbMessage,
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dedupId string,
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) (*meowlib.UserMessage, error)
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```
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Implementation:
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1. Serialise `DeviceSyncPayload{SyncType, PeerUid, DbMessage, DedupId}` with `proto.Marshal`.
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2. Create a `UserMessage` with `Type = "device_sync"`, `Destination = devicePeer.ContactLookupKey`, `Appdata = serialisedPayload`.
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3. Set `Status.Uuid = dedupId`.
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#### 2.2 Dispatch sync to all sibling devices
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```go
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// DispatchSyncToDevices sends a DeviceSyncPayload to every device peer whose
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// pull server list overlaps with the available servers.
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// It enqueues a SendJob per device, reusing the existing bgSendHelper queue.
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func DispatchSyncToDevices(
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storagePath string,
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syncType string,
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peerUid string,
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dbm *meowlib.DbMessage,
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dedupId string,
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) error
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```
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Iterates `identity.OwnedDevices`, builds and queues one `SendJob` per device (just like `CreateUserMessageAndSendJob` but using device peer keys and putting the message in `outbox/` with a recognisable prefix, e.g. `dev_{devPeerUid}_{dedupId}`).
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After calling `peer.ProcessOutboundUserMessage` for each device peer, persist the updated DR state: `identity.DeviceStorage.StorePeer(devPeer)` if `devPeer.DrRootKey != ""`.
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The message is packed into `ToServerMessage.Messages` (same field as regular chat). No server changes needed.
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---
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### Phase 3 — Integrate Dispatch into Send/Receive Paths
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**Files to touch:** `client/helpers/messageHelper.go`, `client/helpers/bgPollHelper.go`
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#### 3.1 After outbound message stored (`CreateAndStoreUserMessage`)
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At the end of `CreateAndStoreUserMessage` (after `peer.StoreMessage`), add:
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```go
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// Async: do not block the caller
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go DispatchSyncToDevices(storagePath, "msg", peerUid, dbm, usermessage.Status.Uuid)
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```
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The `dbm` is obtained from `UserMessageToDbMessage(true, usermessage, nil)` (files are excluded from sync — they stay on the originating device or are re-requested).
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#### 3.2 After inbound message stored (`ConsumeInboxFile`)
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After `peer.StoreMessage(usermsg, filenames)` succeeds:
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```go
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dbm := client.UserMessageToDbMessage(false, usermsg, nil)
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go DispatchSyncToDevices(storagePath, "msg", peer.Uid, dbm, usermsg.Status.Uuid)
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```
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#### 3.3 After ACK status update (`ReadAckMessageResponse` — currently a stub)
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When status timestamps (received/processed) are updated in the DB, dispatch a `"status"` sync with the updated `DbMessage`.
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---
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### Phase 4 — Receive & Consume Device Sync Messages
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**Files to touch:** `client/helpers/bgPollHelper.go`, new `client/helpers/deviceSyncHelper.go`
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#### 4.1 Extend `GetRequestJobs()` to include device lookup keys
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In `identity.go:GetRequestJobs()`, after the loop over `Peers`, add a similar loop over `OwnedDevices`:
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```go
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for _, devPeer := range id.OwnedDevices {
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for _, server := range devPeer.MyPullServers {
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if job, ok := srvs[server]; ok {
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job.LookupKeys = append(job.LookupKeys, devPeer.MyLookupKp)
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}
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}
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}
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```
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Device messages will now arrive inside `from_server.Chat` alongside regular peer messages. The next step distinguishes them.
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#### 4.2 Distinguish device vs peer messages in `ConsumeInboxFile`
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After `identity.Peers.GetFromMyLookupKey(packedUserMessage.Destination)` returns `nil`, try:
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```go
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devPeer := identity.OwnedDevices.GetFromMyLookupKey(packedUserMessage.Destination)
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if devPeer != nil {
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err := ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage(devPeer, packedUserMessage)
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// continue to next message
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continue
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}
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// original error path
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```
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#### 4.3 `ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage` (new file `client/helpers/deviceSyncHelper.go`)
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```go
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func ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage(
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devPeer *client.Peer,
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packed *meowlib.PackedUserMessage,
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) error
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```
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Steps:
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1. Decrypt with `devPeer.ProcessInboundUserMessage(packed)` (takes the full `*PackedUserMessage` — **not** `payload, signature` separately; that API was updated when the sym-encryption + double-ratchet layer was added).
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2. Check `usermsg.Type == "device_sync"`.
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3. Deserialise `DeviceSyncPayload` from `usermsg.Appdata`.
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4. Dedup check: call `IsDeviceSyncSeen(payload.DedupId)`. If yes, skip.
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5. Mark seen: `MarkDeviceSyncSeen(payload.DedupId)`.
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6. **Persist DR state** — after decryption, if `devPeer.DrRootKey != ""`, call `identity.OwnedDevices.StorePeer(devPeer)` (or the equivalent Badger-backed store) to persist the updated `DrStateJson`. This mirrors what `ConsumeInboxFile` does for regular peers.
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7. Dispatch by `payload.SyncType`:
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- `"msg"`: find the local peer by `payload.PeerUid`, call `client.StoreDeviceSyncedMessage(peer, payload.DbMessage)`.
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- `"status"`: update the status fields in the existing DB row matched by `payload.DbMessage.Status.Uuid`.
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- `"peer_update"`: apply `payload.PeerData` to the local peer record (see Phase 6).
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- `"identity_update"`: apply `payload.IdentityData` to the local identity profile (see Phase 6).
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#### 4.4 `StoreDeviceSyncedMessage` in `client/messagestorage.go`
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A thin wrapper around `storeMessage` that:
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- Marks the message as synced (a new bool field `Synced` in `DbMessage`, or use a naming convention in `DbMessage.Appdata`).
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- Does **not** trigger a second round of sync dispatch (no re-broadcast).
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- Handles absent file paths gracefully (files are not synced, only metadata).
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---
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### Phase 6 — Peer Metadata and Identity Profile Sync
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**Files to touch:** `client/helpers/deviceHelper.go`, `client/helpers/deviceSyncHelper.go`, `client/identity.go`
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The goal is to propagate non-message data across sibling devices: peer names/avatars/settings and the identity profile. This is **one-directional fan-out** (whichever device makes the change dispatches to all siblings) — no merge protocol is needed because conflicts are resolved by last-write-wins (the dedupId carries a timestamp or UUID sufficient for dedup; ordering is not guaranteed but is acceptable for profile data).
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#### 6.1 Peer metadata sync (`sync_type = "peer_update"`)
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Dispatch a `"peer_update"` payload whenever a peer record is meaningfully mutated (name, avatar, notification settings, visibility, blocked state, etc.).
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**Payload**: `DeviceSyncPayload.PeerData` is a JSON-encoded **full `Peer` struct**, including all private key material and DR state. This is safe because:
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- The device sync channel is E2E-encrypted with the same X25519 + sym + DR stack as peer messages.
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- The target server is user-owned; the operator is the user themselves.
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- The recipient is the same person on a different device.
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Fields included in `PeerData`:
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- All keypairs in full: `MyIdentity`, `MyEncryptionKp`, `MyLookupKp` (private + public)
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- `MySymKey` — shared symmetric key for that peer's channel
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- `DrKpPrivate`, `DrKpPublic`, `DrRootKey`, `DrInitiator`, `ContactDrPublicKey`
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- **`DrStateJson`** — current live DR session state (see DR note below)
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- All contact keys: `ContactPublicKey`, `ContactEncryption`, `ContactLookupKey`, `ContactPullServers`
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- All metadata: `Name`, `Avatar`, `Avatars`, `MyName`, `Visible`, `Blocked`, `MessageNotification`, `SendDeliveryAck`, `SendProcessingAck`, `CallsAllowed`, server lists, etc.
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Fields excluded from `PeerData`:
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- `dbPassword` — transient in-memory field, never serialised; the receiving device uses its own memory password.
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The receiving device upserts the peer into its local `Peers` store. After applying the sync, the sibling device is a full participant in the conversation: it can send and receive messages using the replicated keypairs, has the same DR session state, and monitors the same lookup key queues.
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**DR state sync (Phase 6 only)**: Syncing `DrStateJson` as part of `"peer_update"` gives sibling devices a working DR session at the point of pairing and keeps them in sync during normal single-active-device use. Phase 7 supersedes this with independent per-device DR sessions, eliminating all shared-state concerns. If Phase 7 is implemented, the `DrStateJson` field in `PeerData` can be omitted from the sync payload (each device initialises its own fresh session via the device introduction flow).
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**New peers**: When Device A completes an invitation with a new contact, it dispatches `"peer_update"` to all siblings with the full peer record. Device B immediately becomes a full participant — same keypairs, same lookup key, same DR session start state — and can transparently send and receive messages with that contact without any secondary invitation.
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#### 6.2 Identity profile sync (`sync_type = "identity_update"`)
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Dispatch an `"identity_update"` whenever `Identity.Nickname`, `Identity.DefaultAvatar`, `Identity.Avatars`, or `Identity.Status` changes.
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**Payload**: `DeviceSyncPayload.IdentityData` is a JSON-encoded subset of `Identity`:
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```go
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type IdentityProfileSnapshot struct {
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Nickname string `json:"nickname"`
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DefaultAvatar string `json:"default_avatar"`
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Avatars []Avatar `json:"avatars"`
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Status string `json:"status"`
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}
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```
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The receiving device deserialises this and updates only the listed fields on its local `Identity`, then calls `identity.Save()`.
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**Explicitly NOT synced** in `IdentityData`:
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- `RootKp` — the user's root signing keypair is the trust anchor; it should be established once per identity creation and never transmitted, even over a secure channel. Compromise of the root key invalidates the entire identity.
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- `Device` — device-specific keypair for server auth; each device has its own.
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- `OwnedDevices` — the device mesh itself; managed separately by the pairing flow.
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- `HiddenPeers` — sensitive by design; out of scope.
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- `DefaultDbPassword`, `DbPasswordStore` — local security preferences.
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- `MessageServers` / `Peers` — covered by their own sync types (`"server_add"`, `"peer_update"`).
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#### 6.3 Server list sync (future — `sync_type = "server_add"`)
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When a new `MessageServer` is added to one device's `MessageServers`, dispatch `"server_add"` so all siblings discover it. Implementation deferred; placeholder `sync_type` reserved.
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#### 6.4 Dispatch hooks
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- After `Identity.InvitePeer` / `FinalizeInvitation` / any peer metadata update: call `DispatchSyncToDevices(..., "peer_update", peer.Uid, nil, uuid.New().String())`.
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- After `Identity.Save()` when profile fields changed: call `DispatchSyncToDevices(..., "identity_update", "", nil, uuid.New().String())`.
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---
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### Phase 7 — Per-Device DR Sessions (Bullet-proof Forward Secrecy)
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**Goal**: Eliminate the concurrent-send DR race without shared ratchet state and without leaking device count to contacts.
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#### 7.0 Privacy constraint
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The naive per-device DR approach (introduce all devices to all contacts) has a fundamental privacy problem: every contact learns how many devices you own and receives session material for each. This leaks metadata — device count, device rotation events, possibly device fingerprints. This is unacceptable for a privacy-first library.
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Two architecturally sound options are described below. **Option B (primary device relay) is recommended** because it preserves complete contact-side opacity and requires no protocol extension on the contact side.
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---
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#### Option A — Contact-aware per-device sessions (not recommended)
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Each device is introduced to all contacts via a `"device_introduce"` message. The contact maintains one independent DR session per device and sends a separate encrypted copy per device on every message.
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| Property | Value |
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|---|---|
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| DR race | ❌ Eliminated |
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| Contact privacy | ❌ Contacts learn device count and session keys |
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| Contact protocol change | ✅ Required (handle `DeviceInfo` list, multi-destination send) |
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| Backward compatibility | ❌ Old clients can't participate |
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| Server changes | ✅ None |
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This is Signal's model. It is appropriate when contacts are expected to be aware of device multiplicity (e.g. a closed ecosystem). It is **not** appropriate for meowlib's open, privacy-first design.
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---
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#### Option B — Primary device relay (recommended)
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The device that owns the peer relationship (the one whose keypairs are in the `Peer` record — call it the **primary**) is the only device that ever communicates directly with a contact. Its DR session with the contact is singular, unshared, and advances normally.
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Sibling devices that want to send a message do so by dispatching a `"forward"` device sync payload to the primary. The primary re-encrypts with the contact's keys and forwards. From the contact's perspective: one sender, one DR session, zero device awareness.
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| Property | Value |
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|---|---|
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| DR race | ❌ Eliminated (only primary drives the DR session) |
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| Contact privacy | ✅ Contact is completely unaware of sibling devices |
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| Contact protocol change | ✅ None required |
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| Backward compatibility | ✅ Full |
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| Server changes | ✅ None |
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| Trade-off | If primary is offline, sibling outbound messages queue until it returns |
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##### 7.1 Primary device designation
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The device that completes the invitation flow for a peer (calls `InvitePeer` or `FinalizeInvitation`) is the primary for that peer. The `Peer` record synced to sibling devices carries a `PrimaryDeviceUid string` field (the UID of the device peer that "owns" this peer relationship):
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```go
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// Add to Peer struct:
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PrimaryDeviceUid string `json:"primary_device_uid,omitempty"`
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// empty = this device IS the primary for this peer
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```
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When a sibling device receives a `"peer_update"` sync, it sets `PrimaryDeviceUid` to the sender's device UID. When the primary device sends a peer update, it leaves `PrimaryDeviceUid` empty (it is the primary).
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##### 7.2 New sync type: `"forward"`
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Add to `DeviceSyncPayload.sync_type`:
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```
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"forward" — sibling device requests primary to send a message to a peer on its behalf
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```
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New fields needed in `DeviceSyncPayload`:
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```protobuf
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bytes forward_payload = 7; // serialized UserMessage (plaintext, will be encrypted by primary)
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string forward_peer_uid = 8; // local peer UID on the primary device to forward to
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```
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##### 7.3 Send path on a sibling device
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When a sibling device (one where `peer.PrimaryDeviceUid != ""`) sends a message to peer P:
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1. Build the `UserMessage` normally.
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2. **Do not** call `peer.ProcessOutboundUserMessage` — the sibling does not have a valid DR state for the contact.
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||
3. Serialize the `UserMessage` (plaintext proto bytes).
|
||
4. Build a `DeviceSyncPayload{SyncType: "forward", ForwardPayload: serialized, ForwardPeerUid: peer.Uid}`.
|
||
5. Dispatch it to the primary device via the normal device sync send path.
|
||
6. Store the message locally with a `"pending_forward"` status so the UI reflects it immediately.
|
||
|
||
##### 7.4 Receive and forward path on the primary device
|
||
|
||
When `ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage` on the primary sees `sync_type == "forward"`:
|
||
|
||
1. Deserialize `ForwardPayload` into a `UserMessage`.
|
||
2. Locate the local peer by `ForwardPeerUid`.
|
||
3. Call `peer.ProcessOutboundUserMessage(userMessage)` — primary uses its DR session normally.
|
||
4. Enqueue a `SendJob` to deliver to the contact's server (same path as any outbound message).
|
||
5. Dispatch a `"msg"` sync back to all siblings with the now-stored `DbMessage` so they update the message status from `"pending_forward"` to sent.
|
||
|
||
##### 7.5 Offline queuing
|
||
|
||
If the primary device is offline when the sibling dispatches a `"forward"` sync, the sync message sits in the device sync queue on the server (same Redis sorted-set as all device messages). When the primary comes back online and polls, it picks up the forwarded message and delivers it. No message is lost; latency equals the primary's offline window.
|
||
|
||
##### 7.6 Result
|
||
|
||
- Zero contact protocol changes. Contacts cannot distinguish a primary-only device from a multi-device user.
|
||
- No device count leakage. Device topology is fully opaque to the outside world.
|
||
- No DR race. The primary drives a single ratchet per contact.
|
||
- No server changes.
|
||
- `ProcessOutboundUserMessage` signature stays `(*PackedUserMessage, error)` — no ripple through callers.
|
||
- Trade-off is well-bounded: forward latency ≤ primary polling interval, which is already the existing long-poll timeout.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### Phase 5 — Dedup Store
|
||
|
||
**Files to touch:** new `client/devicesyncdedup.go`
|
||
|
||
A single SQLite DB per identity folder: `{StoragePath}/{IdentityUuid}/devicesync.db`.
|
||
|
||
Schema:
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS seen (
|
||
id TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
seen_at INTEGER NOT NULL
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Functions:
|
||
```go
|
||
func IsDeviceSyncSeen(storagePath, identityUuid, dedupId string) (bool, error)
|
||
func MarkDeviceSyncSeen(storagePath, identityUuid, dedupId string) error
|
||
func PruneDeviceSyncSeen(storagePath, identityUuid string, olderThan time.Duration) error
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`PruneDeviceSyncSeen` is called periodically (e.g. weekly) from the background thread to remove entries older than 30 days.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## File Change Summary
|
||
|
||
| File | Change |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| `pb/messages.proto` | Add `DeviceSyncPayload` message (with `peer_data` and `identity_data` fields) |
|
||
| `pb/protogen.sh` → re-run | Regenerate `.pb.go` |
|
||
| `client/identity.go` | Add `InitDevicePairing`, `AnswerDevicePairing`, `FinalizeDevicePairing`; add `DeviceStorage PeerStorage` field; extend `GetRequestJobs()`; add profile-change dispatch hooks |
|
||
| `client/peer.go` | No changes needed (Type field already exists) |
|
||
| `client/messagestorage.go` | Add `StoreDeviceSyncedMessage` |
|
||
| `client/devicesyncdedup.go` | **New** — dedup SQLite helpers |
|
||
| `client/helpers/deviceHelper.go` | **New** — `BuildDeviceSyncMessage`, `DispatchSyncToDevices` (msg + peer_update + identity_update), pairing message helpers |
|
||
| `client/helpers/deviceSyncHelper.go` | **New** — `ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage` (handles all sync types) |
|
||
| `client/helpers/messageHelper.go` | Add `DispatchSyncToDevices` call after outbound store; detect primary vs sibling role on send |
|
||
| `client/helpers/bgPollHelper.go` | Add device message detection in `ConsumeInboxFile` |
|
||
| `client/peer.go` | Add `PrimaryDeviceUid string` field; sibling send path dispatches `"forward"` instead of direct send |
|
||
| `client/helpers/deviceSyncHelper.go` | Handle `"forward"` sync type: deserialize, re-encrypt, enqueue SendJob, dispatch `"msg"` sync back |
|
||
|
||
Server package: **no changes required**.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Sync Scope
|
||
|
||
| Data | Synced | Notes |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| Message text / data | ✅ | In `DbMessage.Data` |
|
||
| Outbound flag | ✅ | In `DbMessage.Outbound` |
|
||
| Message UUID | ✅ | Via `ConversationStatus.Uuid` |
|
||
| Sent/received timestamps | ✅ | In `ConversationStatus` |
|
||
| File content | ❌ | Not synced; only `FilePaths` metadata synced |
|
||
| Peer full keypairs (private + public) | ✅ | Phase 6 — included in `"peer_update"` `PeerData`; channel is E2E-encrypted on user-owned server |
|
||
| Peer symmetric key | ✅ | Phase 6 — included in `"peer_update"` `PeerData` |
|
||
| Peer DR session state (`DrStateJson`) | ✅ | Phase 6 — synced on peer_update; Phase 7 (Option B) eliminates the need: primary drives one DR session, siblings never touch it |
|
||
| Peer metadata (name, avatar, settings) | ✅ | Phase 6 — `"peer_update"` sync type |
|
||
| New peer (unknown to sibling) | ✅ | Full peer record synced; sibling becomes immediate full participant |
|
||
| Identity profile (nickname, avatar, status) | ✅ | Phase 6 — `"identity_update"` sync type |
|
||
| Identity root keypair (`RootKp`) | ❌ | Trust anchor; never transmitted even over secure channel |
|
||
| Known/message server list | ⚠️ | Future — `"server_add"` placeholder reserved |
|
||
| Hidden peers | ❌ | Hidden by design; out of scope |
|
||
| Device keypair | ❌ | Per-device; each device authenticates to servers with its own key |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Privacy Properties
|
||
|
||
- Device sync messages are end-to-end encrypted (same X25519 + sym + DR stack as peer messages).
|
||
- The server sees only the device lookup key as destination; it cannot distinguish sync messages from peer messages.
|
||
- Including device lookup keys in batch pull requests does not leak which device belongs to you (same privacy model as multiple peer lookup keys per request).
|
||
- `OwnedDevices` peers should be treated as "hidden" (not shown in contact lists) and stored in the device storage, separate from regular peers.
|
||
- **Contacts are never made aware of device count or device identity** (Phase 7 Option B). The primary device relay model means the outside world observes exactly one sender per user identity, regardless of how many devices are active.
|
||
- The device mesh topology (which devices exist, how many) is known only to the user's own devices, and is carried exclusively over the E2E-encrypted device sync channel on the user-owned server.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Testing Strategy
|
||
|
||
1. **Unit tests** for `DeviceSyncPayload` serialisation round-trip.
|
||
2. **Unit tests** for dedup store (seen/mark/prune lifecycle).
|
||
3. **Integration test** extending `TestEndToEnd`:
|
||
- Create identity, two device peers (DeviceA, DeviceB).
|
||
- Send a message on DeviceA.
|
||
- Verify DeviceB's DB contains the synced message after `ConsumeDeviceSyncMessage`.
|
||
- Resend the same dedup_id — verify no duplicate row created.
|
||
4. **Integration test** for inbound sync:
|
||
- DeviceA receives a peer message.
|
||
- Verify DeviceB gets the sync and stores it correctly.
|